The rapid development of Internet of Things (IoT) technology, which is an inter connection of networks through an insecure public channel i.e. Internet demands for authenticating the remote user trying to access the secure network resources. In 2013, Ankita et al. proposed an improved three factor remote user authentication scheme. In this poster we will show that Ankita et al scheme is vulnerable to known session specific temporary information attack, on successfully performing the attack, the adversary can perform all other major cryptographic attacks. As a part of our contribution, we will propose an improved scheme which is resistance to all major cryptographic attacks and overcomes the defects in Ankita et al. scheme.
INTRODUCTION

Registration Phase
R1. U i selects his identity ID i , password PW i and computes W=h(PW i ||N) and submits his biometrics information B i at fuzzy extractor to get Gen(B i ) = (R i ,P i ), and submits ID i , W to server S, through a secure channel, where N is a random number generated by U i . R2. After validating ID i , S computes H=h(ID i ||X), e = H⊕W. S issues a user's smart card containing information {e, h(), p, g, Y} and sends it to U i through a secure channel. where Y = g X mod p . R3. On receiving the smart card, U i computes L= N⊕R i and V = h(ID i ||PW i ||N). U i stores P i , L, V into the smart card.
Login Phase
Whenever user U i wants to login to the remote server S, the user will perform the following steps.
L1. U i inserts his smart card into a card reader and inputs the ID i , PW i and personal biometrics B i on fuzzy extractor to get R i = Rep(B i ,P i ). On validating the B i , smart card performs the following steps. mod p, NID = ID i ⊕A2, C i = h(ID i ||H||A1||A2||T1) and sends the login message <NID,A1,C i ,T1> to S, where T1 is the U's current timestamp.
Authentication Phase
After receiving the login request message, the remote server S will perform the following steps: 
Cryptanalysis of Ankita et al Scheme
To analyze the security of Ankits et al.'s scheme, we assume that an attacker could obtain the secret values stored in the smart card of U i i.e {e i , h(), p, g, Y, P i , L,V } by monitoring the power consumption [2] and the intercepted messages i.e <NID,A1,C i ,T1>, <Cs,A4,T3> between the user and the server.
Known Session Specific Temporary Information Attack
If an adversary 'E' gets the session secret value of user U i . i.e r u and biometric information B i , 'E' can perform following steps.
Step1: Frame A1=g ru mod p, A2 = Y ru mod p.
Step 2: 'E' can frame ID i = NID⊕A2, from intercepted login message <NID,A1,C i ,T1>.
Step Step 4: Frame C i = h (ID i ||e⊕h(PW i ||N)||A1||A2||T1) . In C i , 'E' knows all the values of U i except PW i . Now 'E' can perform password guessing attack on C i . Guess the value of PW i to be PW i * from uniformly distributed dictionary and check C i * = h(ID i ||e⊕h(PW i * ||N)||A1||A2||T1). If both sides are equal, then the U i password is PW i *. Otherwise 'E' can repeat the process to get correct value PW i *. On getting correct password PW i , 'E' can frame H = e⊕h(PW i *||N).
Step 5: Compute A6 = (A4) ru mod p = (g rs ) ru mod p from intercepted message < Cs, A4,T3>.
On getting PW i , ID i , N as discussed above, the adversary can frame the session key S.K = h(ID i ||A2||A6||H||T1||T3) and can perform all major cryptographic attacks like user impersonation, DoS, Masquerade attacks etc.
PROPOSED SCHEME
Registration Phase
R1. U i selects his identity ID i , password PW i and computes W=h(PW i ||N||T1) and submits his biometrics information B i at fuzzy extractor to get Gen(B i ) = (R i ,P i ), and submits ID i , W to server S at time T1, through a secure channel, where N is a random number generated by U i . R2. On receiving the login message at time T2, After validating ID i , S computes G=h(ID i ||X), H=G⊕T2, e = H ⊕W. S issues a user's smart card containing information {e, h(), p, g, Y}, T1⊕T2 to U i through a secure channel. where Y = g X mod p . R3. On receiving the smart card, U i computes L= N ⊕ R i ⊕T1 and V = h(ID i ||T1||PW i ||T2||N). U i stores P i , L, V, M= h(ID i ⊕ T2)⊕T1, N=h(PW i ||R i )⊕T2 into the smart card.
Login Phase
Whenever user U i wants to login to the remote server S, the user will perform the following steps. 
Authentication Phase
4.
SECURITY ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SCHEME Table 1 . Type of users and the values they know Table 2 
. Cost comparison among various smart card schemes
In our scheme the legal adversary 'E' is assumed to know B i , r u, r s, smart card values of legal user U i . Due to no chance of getting the values ID i , T1, T2, T3, T4 and T5 of U i , it's not possible for 'E' to guess any unknown value of U i and to perform any kind of attack, where as in Ankita et al. scheme with B i , r u value the adversary can come to know the passowrd of U i and can perform all major atatcks. Hence we conclue that with negligible increase in computation, communication and storage cost we have proposed a robust remote user authentication scheme which is resistant to all major attacks.
5.
